Security,
in the open.

This update is recorded in the project’s public commit history. Open the commit for the complete change and discussion.

This update is recorded in the project’s public commit history. Open the commit for the complete change and discussion.

* docs: align security claims with released and current CLI behavior * docs: mark pending audit controls and narrow Rekor claim

feat(security): add live security updates page

This update is recorded in the project’s public commit history. Open the commit for the complete change and discussion.

This update is recorded in the project’s public commit history. Open the commit for the complete change and discussion.

This update is recorded in the project’s public commit history. Open the commit for the complete change and discussion.

The Linux installer privilege restriction is applied through a safe process-launch path, removing the custom unsafe pre-execution block.

Managed installers receive closed standard input and Linux no_new_privs, limiting privilege gains through executable setuid, setgid and file capabilities.

Security receipts include streaming SHA-256 hashes of published executable and script targets, using paths relative to the installation.

The previous managed-tool directory is retained through activation. Failed command linking triggers restoration and cleanup of broken links from the failed version.

Tool binary entries are resolved and checked against their installation directory before activation and again when shared command links are created.

Each managed installation stores a security receipt describing its source policy, active exceptions and effective verification and build settings.

Secured manager commands run outside the project tree. Cargo configuration is isolated and pip configuration files are disabled to limit inherited source settings.

The resolved manager executable is retained for user-managed runtimes, while project-local manager selection is rejected by the secured command builder.

Manager-specific package-name rules reject local paths, Git shorthands and alternate-source specifications for registry-backed tool installs.

Go tool installs disable CGO and automatic toolchain downloads by default. Each capability has its own package-specific exception.

npm first installs with lifecycle scripts disabled, then runs signature checks. An explicitly approved script rebuild happens after verification.

Every matching package-specific security override is printed before installation, so exceptions remain visible when installing or updating tools.

Installer child processes use a restricted executable search path instead of inheriting every directory from the calling shell.

Managed npm, Cargo, pip and Go installs use a separate home and configuration. Defaults disable npm lifecycle scripts, require Python wheels and use Cargo lockfiles, with explicit compatibility exceptions.

Selected high-risk AUR packages require a second build whose output matches before installation. The policy covers sensitive integration content and privileged package features.

Package-manager hardening strengthens trusted executable selection, privilege boundaries and AUR artifact handling, alongside runtime verification improvements.

* Fix authentication and ingestion boundaries and enforce CI toolchain ordering * Update Cloudflare test and build tooling to patched sharp closure * Keep dashboard credential helper private to its handler * Pin reviewed installer snapshot and preserve public artifact bytes * Throttle internal firehose requests and protect all API responses * Synchronize safe installer replacement and clarify analytics bounds * Update public installer fixture for reviewed replacement semantics